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1 Introduction
Mergers and acquisitions (M&A) are a key part of a firm’s corporate growth strategy
as they allow firms to achieve economies of scale, access to new markets, or respond to
economic shocks. Undoubtedly, M&As are among the largest investments that a firm will
ever undertake and thus few economic phenomenas gain as much research attention as
the diverse forms of corporate takeovers, as stated by Betton et al. (2008). For example,
the chip manufacturer Broadcom Ltd recently announced a $103 billion bid for the US-
based Qualcomm Inc, which is higher than the gross domestic product (GDP) of European
countries such as Luxembourg, Slovak Republic, and Bulgaria.
While much is understood regarding the strategic motivation and economic reasoning
of past merger waves (e.g. Schwert 2000), recent M&A patterns, however, have brought
a distinctive new feature that lack coherent theoretic reasoning: serial acquisitions. Over
recent years, Western and emerging market firms alike have established extensive serial
acquisition programs (e.g. Ismail 2008). For example, some of the most active multiple
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acquirers like Cisco, GE, Microsoft, among others, are engaged in acquisition programs
where each acquired more than 50 companies (see Laamanen and Keil 2008, Smit and
Moraitis 2015). By now, the literature on serial acquisitions and acquisition programs
alike has acknowledged that multiple acquisitions create a strategic momentum due to,
e.g., learning, synergies, or risk mitigation, which has motivated an extensive number of
empirical research papers in the domain of finance and strategic management (see e.g., Am-
burgey and Miner 1992, Frick and Torres 2002, Rovit and Lemire 2003, Smit and Moraitis
2015). However, to date less attention has been given to the question why some firms
prefer to follow the incremental acquisition steps over single acquisitions. Similarly, the
finance literature dealing with the question whether serial acquisitions create substantial
value show also mixed results. For example, while Rovit and Lemire (2003) find evidence
that serial acquisitions create value, Fuller et al. (2002) and Billett and Qian (2008) find
the opposite.
Apart from specifically analyzing strategic acquisition programs, this paper also relates
to a broader theoretical literature on M&A dynamics, where merger timing plays an
important role. Historically, the finance literature has dealt only rarely with applying
game theory to determine optimal terms of mergers. As one of the first attempts to
model the negotiation process in takeovers by means of game theory Powers (1987) used
a special version of voting games between N -player to analyze the negotiation between
several share- and stakeholders. The paper of Roy (1989) is probably the earliest attempt
that considered a two-player setting, i.e. a bidder bargaining with one target. Here, the
takeover process was modeled as a non-cooperative bargaining game under uncertainty
where a buyer proposes a bid and the seller can decide whether to accept the offer or not.
The model determines the bidder’s optimal offer strategy given that the bidder does not
possess information about the true value of the target’s reservation price. On the contrary,
van den Honert and Stewart (1992) were among the first that use cooperative game-theory
to model a friendly merger. The analytical models that emerged since then have followed
such a convention, i.e. build on a non-cooperative take-it-or-leave-it approach for modeling
hostile takeovers and use a cooperative game-theoretic model for modeling friendly mergers
2
(see e.g. Hirshleifer (1995);Goldman and Qian (2005); Mason and Weeds (2010)).
Nonetheless, these models are mostly static, i.e. the other party cannot decide on the
timing, and it is due to the ongoing trend of empirical research in the domain of M&A that
dynamic theoretical models have become scarce. A few years ago, literature in the domain
of investment under uncertainty has started to close this gap. In particular, this stream of
real options literature acknowledges the shared real options available to both parties when
negotiating the terms of the agreement in such contracting situations. These recent papers
have investigated how merger timing and value creation are affected by the way M&A deals
are settled, i.e. either friendly or hostile and followed the past literature modeling pattern
with respect to the kind of game theory applied. In particular, Hackbarth and Morellec
(2008) and Morellec and Zhdanov (2005) among others looked at friendly mergers between
two firms and used a cooperative game-theoretic approach to determine the terms of the
merger while others used a non-cooperative approach to determine the terms of hostile
takeovers (Lambrecht 2004, Lambrecht and Myers 2007, Thijssen 2008, Lukas and Welling
2012). The findings reveal that in hostile takeovers the bidder can claim a larger stake in
the new entity due to its first-mover advantage. However, this is associated with timing
inefficiencies, i.e. the hostile takeover occurs inefficiently late when compared with the
friendly mergers as being the first-best.
So far, however, the literature has predominantly neglected the follow-up opportunities
M&As generate which are at the essence of serial acquisition programs. There are only a
few exceptions. First, Alvarez and Stenbacka (2006) look at the possibility of a later sell-off
of parts of the new entity to a third party. Second, Hackbarth and Morellec (2008) look at
subsequent growth options available to the new entity after a merger. Only recently, two
papers have dropped the two-firm perspective and looked at industry dynamics associated
with M&A opportunities arising within a N -firm economy. In particular, Hackbarth and
Miao (2012) look at the incumbents’ propensity to engage in friendly mergers if the in-
dustry exhibits competition à la Cournot and is subject to random shocks. Their findings
reveal that M&As are more likely in industries that are exposed to industry-wide shocks
and that overall M&A timing is the more delayed the higher the level of industry concen-
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tration is. Dimopoulos and Sacchetto (2017) add to this perspective the possibility that
the industry also exhibits new entrants as well as firm exits. As in Hackbarth and Miao
(2012), only incumbents are allowed to merge and their findings show that an industry’s
M&A activity significantly stimulates new entry of firms, which increases productivity,
while, at the same time, inducing less productive incumbents to delay their exit strategy.
Their findings also reveal that the positive effect of M&A prevails, i.e. merger activity
increases an industry’s productivity.
However, all these models are silent on the role of serial acquisitions for M&A timing
and contracting which are central to our analysis. In particular, neither of the aforemen-
tioned papers looks at compounded shared real options, i.e. how bargaining about the
terms of the first transaction is affected by the bargaining outcome of a subsequent M&A
transaction. As in the classical non-game-theoretic literature on growth options, how-
ever, this should have a positive effect on M&A timing and contracting, respectively (see,
e.g. Hackbarth and Morellec 2008). Alike, all the aforementioned models only consider
friendly mergers where the surplus is shared cooperatively. Since hostile takeovers allow
the bidding firm to exploit first-mover advantages we would expect that subsequent hostile
takeover opportunities exhibit higher option values and should significantly alter initial
merger terms. Hence, to date some important research questions remain: First, under
which circumstances is it optimal to engage in a serial acquisition program rather than
follow a big leap, i.e. the single acquisition of a large incumbent? Obviously, a trade-off
exists since acquiring more than one firm is costly but this acquisition can enhance sub-
sequent bargaining power in follow-up acquisitions. Second, what can we say about the
strategy design of an acquisition program (hostile/friendly/mixed) or of a big leap (hos-
tile/friendly) and how do uncertainty and synergies affect the optimal strategy design?
Again, a trade-off emerges since a hostile takeover allows the bidding firm to capture a
greater share of the surplus but suffers from timing inefficiencies, i.e. hostile takeovers
are settled inefficiently late. Consequently, discounting can erode the greater share of the
surplus. Finally, it is unclear how subsequent acquisitions affect the contract design and
timing of M&As in an acquisition program.
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The present paper tries to answer to these questions. Our contribution to the literature
is twofold. First, we provide a methodological contribution, i.e. we analytically derive
optimal contracts for real option games under uncertainty where the initial bargaining
outcome is influenced by a subsequent bargaining game. Our results indicate that under
certain circumstances a first-mover pass-through exists which enables the first-mover to
fully or partially use his first-advantage in subsequent games. Second, our model advances
the real option literature on M&As by looking closer at the determinants that drive the
choice between acquisition programs and single acquisitions. In particular, our model
builds on the assumption that a new entrant has identified two promising incumbents, a
large and a smaller one, of which he mostly desires to acquire the larger one. To implement
his strategy, he can either acquire the large incumbent right away (big leap) or setting
up an acquisition program, i.e. first acquire the small before proceed with acquiring the
larger incumbent.
We find that a big leap strategy tends to be preferred when uncertainty is low and for
relatively lower synergies between the buyer and a minor incumbent, unless the first ac-
quisition enables access to a high synergistic subsequent acquisition of a large incumbent.
We show that for sufficiently large synergies of subsequent deals, the acquisition program
may be preferable even when acquiring the minor firm destroys value (has negative syner-
gies). Moreover, our findings indicate that synergies have a significant impact on the deal
structure of acquisition programs. In particular, high synergies between the buyer and
the minor incumbent increase the propensity of the new entrant to follow a pure friendly
merger strategy, where both acquisitions are cooperatively negotiated. On the contrary,
we find that higher synergies between the entrant and the large incumbent stimulate a
pure hostile acquisition strategy, where both acquisitions are non-cooperatively structured.
Finally, we show under which circumstances the deal structure of subsequent M&As af-
fect the contractual design of upstream bilateral bargaining. In particular, our results
indicate that, whenever an acquisition program is designed in a way that it is preferable
for the new entrant to acquire both incumbents one immediately after the other, i.e. a
big-bang solution, rather than acquiring the minor one first followed by a delayed acquisi-
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tion of the prominent incumbent, then subsequent deal characteristics associated with the
large incumbent affect the optimal contract design offered to the minor incumbent. On
the contrary, when the acquisitions are truly sequential, the contract design of the initial
acquisition is not affected by the characteristics of the subsequent deal.
The paper unfolds as follows. Section 2 presents a description of the acquisition strate-
gies. In Section 3 and 4 the models are derived for two alternative strategies, the big leap
and acquisition program, as well as for the different contract designs. Section 5 presents
the rules for the choice of best strategy, analyses the optimal strategy choices, and presents
some testable predictions that arise from the results. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
2 Acquisition strategies
Consider a setting of three firms. One firm, i.e. E, is planning to enter a new market
and has identified two firms, a large firm L and a minor firm M as potential acquisition
targets.1 While E is not yet active in the market and has thus no capital installed, i.e.
KE = 0, each incumbent firm l ∈ {L,M} is endowed with a capital stock Kl and is subject
to an industry wide shock modeled by means of a geometric Brownian motion, i.e.:
dx(t) = αx(t)dt+ σx(t)dW (t) (1)
where α ∈ R < r denotes the instantaneous drift, under the risk-neutral measure, r is the
risk-free interest rate, σ ∈ R+ denotes the instantaneous variance and dW denotes the
standard Wiener increment.2 We will assume that
Vl(t) = Klx(t), l ∈ {L,M} (2)
1Here, L and M are just two firms within an economy -among others- that could be acquired. A good
reason for such an assumption might be that both incumbents are publicly traded and thus the new entrant
has zero search cost since these firms are listed while other incumbent are hidden, e.g. because they are
family owned and thus not listed. Such a setting is in particular very common in continental European
states like e.g. Germany, Portugal, Italy, or Austria.
2This condition ensures a finite trigger. The condition also ensures that the stochastic discount factor
has a meaningful solution. It is not sufficient, however, to guarantee that the trigger is reached almost
surely. For the more strict condition α > σ
2
2
, we get a finite expected hitting time, i.e., E[T ∗] <∞.
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were Vl(t) is the incumbents’ individual stand-alone values.
In order to become active in the market, the new entrant E must acquire an incumbent.
We will assume that E’s main intention is to acquire the prominent incumbent L. To do
so, it is faced with two generic strategies. The first is to make a bid right away to the large
firm L (the big leap strategy) and the second is to make a bid to the minor firm M and, in
a subsequent step, offer a bid to the prominent incumbent (the serial acquisition program).
This assumption needs some further explanation. Obviously, in both cases the result would
be a very large entity. However, since we assume that there are still other firms in the
economy we thereby rule out the formation of monopoly power. Second, the new entrant
can also consider to acquire M after acquiring L. However, we believe that most recent
serial acquisitions are not driven to form monopolies but to buy the prominent competitor.
The recent acquisition of KuKa (Germany) by Midea (China) which was commented by
the Bloomberg with the headline “Chinese-Owned Robot Maker Is Gunning for No. 1
in Booming Market” might serve as a representative example.3 Hence, we refrain from
explicitly modeling product market competition and concentrate more on the effect of
subsequent M&A possibilities that an initial acquisition strategy may generate.
We assume that the new entrant possesses complementary capabilities that enable the
acquisition synergies, which gives it the ability to define the best acquisition strategy.
Therefore, the incumbent firms have a more passive role. We assume that neither they
consider the possibility of whether another acquisition method could increase their value,
nor they are able to anticipate that a new firm E will enter the market by means of an
acquisition. We also assume that the intention of firm E is only revealed when it enters
the market, making the first acquisition. If the incumbent firms anticipate that they can
be acquired by an outside firm, they may consider merging in advance, enhancing their
bargaining power when facing the new entrant. For them, such a defensive strategy may
be more valuable than staying independent, depending on the associated synergies and
costs. In this paper we focus in the case where only the new entrant is able to define the
optimal strategy and it does not reveal its intention to enter the market before making
3Bloomberg News 8. March 2017
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the first acquisition.
To implement both generic strategies, i.e. big leap or acquisition program, the new
entrant can choose between a hostile takeover bid and a friendly bid. We follow van den
Honert and Stewart (1992), Lambrecht (2004), Hackbarth and Morellec (2008), Morellec
and Zhdanov (2005) and assume that a friendly merger is modeled as a cooperative game
between two firms which jointly decide on the sharing rule of the surplus and on the
timing of the merger. In contrast, a hostile takeover is modeled as a non-cooperative
game where the bidder offers a premium to the target.4. Here we draw upon Lambrecht
(2001), Betton et al. (2008), Betton and Moran (2003), Lukas and Welling (2012) and
assume that contingent on the premium offered by the bidder, the target then decides on
the timing of the takeover. Hence, E’s action set is characterized by a 3 × 2 matrix (see
Figure 1). In particular, apart from a merger (hostile takeover) with (of) L, E can choose
between a hostile takeover of M followed by a friendly merger with L (mixed acquisition
program), a hostile takeover of both M and L (pure hostile takeover program), a friendly
takeover of both M and L (pure friendly merger program), or a friendly merger with M
followed by a hostile takeover of L (mixed acquisition program).5
In the following, we will take a closer look at the new entrants individual strategies. For
modeling purposes a pair {i, j}, appearing in subscript, defines the M&A program, where
i ∈ {bh, bf, hh, hf, fh, ff} indicates the strategy where bh and bf refer to hostile/friendly
big leap, hh and ff the pure hostile/friendly acquisition program, and hf and fh refer to
the mixed acquisition program strategies; and finally j ∈ {EM,M,L} identifies the firm.
4The assumption that the bidder is the first-mover is supported by the empirical literature which shows
that in the majority of hostile takeover cases it is the potential buyer who submit a formal bid and thus
initiating the takeover (e.g. Andrade and Stafford (2004); Boone and Mulherin (2007); Fidrmuc et al.
(2012)).
5For the sake of simplicity, we rule out the possibility that negotiating triggers a takeover contest, where
two or more bidders, i.e. E and L or E and M compete for a particular target. Such an assumption is in
line with the findings in the empirical literature indicating that the acquisition process is mostly bilateral,
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Figure 1: 2× 3 matrix characterizing the new entrant’s E action set.
i ∈ {bh, bf, hh, hf, fh, ff} indicates the strategy, where bh and bf refer to hos-
tile/friendly big leap, hh and ff the pure hostile/friendly acquisition program, and
hf and fh refer to the mixed acquisition program strategies.
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3 The Big Leap
Let us start by considering the big leap, where the new entrant moves directly to the
acquisition of the large firm. Two alternative strategies need to be considered: either
the acquisition of the large firm is a cooperative game (i.e., the firm opts for a friendly
merger), or, on the contrary, is a non-cooperative game (where the firm places an hostile
offer).
There are arguments that may justify each strategy. On the one hand, the entrant
prefers to gain a fast entry into the new market, potentially at a lower transaction cost.6
Obviously, undertaking the non-cooperative takeover would lead to timing inefficiencies
and unnecessarily delays the acquisition of L. On the other hand, the hostile takeover
strategy allows the new entrant E to capture a greater fraction of the generated surplus
since it will hold the greater bargaining power due to the first-mover advantage.
3.1 Non-Cooperative Acquisition of the Large Firm
In order to model the acquisition dynamics, we will rely on a non-cooperative bargaining
solution, i.e. the new entrant offers the large incumbent a premium ψbh,L > 0 while the
large firm times the acquisition, i.e., L optimally chooses the timing when the acquisition
takes place.7 Let (ωEL−1)KL > 0 denote the synergies on the large firm’s value, εELTh,EL
and (1− εEL)Th,EL denote the transaction costs of the hostile acquisition assigned to each
party, where εEL ∈ (0, 1) indicates the fraction of the transaction costs (Th,EL) assigned
to E. The synergies between the new entrant and the incumbent firm may arise from
complementary capabilities: exploiting strengths or new processes, or practices, allowing
to reduce costs or enhance revenues.
Consequently, the large firm receives ψbh,LKLx(t) in exchange for its assets worth
KLx(t) and has to bear transaction costs of (1 − εEL)Th,EL. Following standard real
options reasoning, for any given premium level, ψbh,L, L’s timing decision to sell the
6We allow for different transactions costs for cooperative and non-cooperative acquisitions. It is rea-
sonable to assume that hostile takeovers are more costly than friendly mergers.
7Similar dynamics can be found, for instance, in Lukas and Welling (2012).
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is the positive root of the standard fundamental
quadratic equation (see Dixit and Pindyck 1994). On the other side, the new entrant E
anticipates the reaction function of the target L and grants an optimal premium such that
it maximizes its objective function, i.e.:
max
ψbh,L





Solving both objective functions recursively leads to the following result:9
Proposition 1. The acquisition of the large firm takes place if the large firm receives an
optimal premium ψ∗bh,L and waits until x(t) hits the optimal trigger value x(t) = x
∗
bh,L
where ψ∗bh,L and x
∗
bh,L are given by:
ψ∗bh,L = 1 +
(β1 − 1)(1− εEL)
β1 − εEL








Notice that, assuming E’s offer is a take-it-or-leave-it offer, L finds no incentive to
deviate from the optimal decision (e.g., by refusing the bid). In fact, if L rejects the deal
8We follow the common assumption in the literature of M&A dynamic models of setting a reserve
price for the target equal to the value of the assets in place (e.g., Lambrecht 2004, Lukas and Welling
2012). However, the model can be easily extended to incorporate a larger reserve price, by replacing
(ψbh,L − 1)KLx(t) by (ψbh,L − α)KLx(t), α > 1.
9When the reserve price of the target is αKLx(t), 1 < α < ωEL, it can be shown that the bidder offers
a lower net premium (ψ∗bh,L − α) and the takeover is deterred (higher x∗bh,L). When the reserve price is
such that it captures all the synergies (α = ωEL), the takeover is deterred forever.
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it will end-up in a worse off position, which is not reasonable in our full rational setting.
3.2 Cooperative Acquisition of the Large Firm
Obviously, the new entrant could also acquire L by means of a friendly merger which marks
the bf strategy indicated in Figure 1. Hence, both will jointly negotiate the terms of the
contract. Following Alvarez and Stenbacka (2006) and Thijssen (2008), let us assume that
after the merger, each firm holds an equity stake in the new firm, γ for firm E and 1− γ
for firm L. The large firm will give up its stand-alone value VL = KLx(t) and receives
a stake in the new venture, upon incurring the transaction cost (1 − εEL)Tf,EL, thereby
profiting from the synergies (ωEL − 1)KL that arise out of the merger. Hence, firm L’s
net gain becomes:
max [((1− γ)ωELKL −KL)x(t)− (1− εEL)Tf,EL; 0] (8)
On the contrary, firm E’s net gain amounts to:
max [γωELKLx(t)− εELTf,EL; 0] (9)
Assuming that both firms possess a certain amount of bargaining power exogenously
given, ηEL for firm E and 1− ηEL for firm L, then the optimal share each firm has in the




(((1− γ)ωELKL −KL)x(t)− (1− εEL)Tf,EL)1−ηEL
(γωELKLx(t)− εELTf,EL)ηEL ] (10)
Since we are focusing on a cooperative game the optimal investment trigger equals

















Consequently, solving the cooperative bargaining game by means of the Nash-Bargaining
solution leads to the following proposition:














Firm E’s optimal stake γ∗bf,EL in the merger amounts to:
γ∗bf,EL =
(







It is shown that the hostile takeover produces a trigger that is timing inefficient when
compared to that of the friendly merger (even for similar transaction costs). In fact, the
latter solution ensures a social (aggregate) first best, while the former is an individual first
best that leads to a deal that occurs inefficiently late.10
4 The Acquisition Program
Let us assume now that firm E can, alternatively to the big leap, start an acquisition
program by making an offer to the minor firm M , with the ultimate goal of acquiring




bh,L, for Tf,EL 6 Th,EL. Similar results already appear in the related
literature. The decision regarding the strategy to be followed by the bidder will be discussed in section 5.
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L. In particular, the new entrant can offer the minor incumbent a premium in a non-
cooperative takeover or can acquire it by means of a friendly merger. After acquiring the
minor firm, the new entity EM can acquire the large incumbent L by means of a hostile
takeover or a friendly merger. The solutions for each of the four combinations presented
in Figure 1 are determined in a backwards procedure, starting from the two alternatives
for acquiring L.
4.1 Non-Cooperative Acquisition of the Large Firm
We start by considering that EM (which labels the new entity E and M after the first
acquisition takes place) decides to acquire L under an hostile takeover. The dynamics of
this game has already been presented in Section 3.1 and consist in EM offering a premium
to L, while L times the merger. Since we assume E’s capabilities are what enables the
synergies, we model them as (ωML − 1)KL, with ωML > 1.11 The overall value of the
firm, after EM and L have combined, is ωMLKL + ωEMKM , where ωEMKM is the value
of EM , resulting from the acquisition of M by the new entrant E. Following the same
procedures as before we state that,
Proposition 3. For the non-cooperative takeover, the large firm receives an optimal pre-
mium ψ∗ih,L, i ∈ {f, h}, and waits optimally until x(t) hits the trigger value x∗ih,L, given
by:
ψ∗ih,L = 1 +
(β1 − 1)(1− εML)
(β1 − εML)









4.2 Cooperative Acquisition of the Large Firm
Let us now consider the second alternative, where EM opts for negotiating a friendly
merger with L. Following similar steps as in Section 3.2, we assume that the large firm
11The generic synergies may also take the form of additional market power (Thijssen 2008) or economies
of scale (Lambrecht 2004).
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will give up his stand-alone value VL = KLx(t) and will receive upon paying the transaction
cost (1− εML)TML a stake (1−γ) in the new venture thereby profiting from the synergies
(ωML − 1)KL > 0 that arise out of the merger. Hence, firm L’s net gain becomes:
max [((1− γ)(ωMLKL + ωEMKM )−KL)x(t)− (1− εML)Tf,ML; 0] (16)
where ωEMKM reflects the first acquisition, occurred in an earlier stage. Similarly, firm
EM ’s net gain amounts to:
max [(γ(ωMLKL + ωEMKM )− ωEMKM )x(t)− εMLTf,ML; 0] (17)
Assuming that both firms possess a certain amount of bargaining power, ηML for firm
EM and 1 − ηML for firm L, then the optimal share each firm has in the new venture




(((1− γ)(ωMLKL + ωEMKM )−KL)x(t)− (1− εML)Tf,ML)1−ηML
((γ(ωMLKL + ωEMKM )− ωEMKM )x(t)− εMLTf,ML)ηML ] (18)






As in Section 3.2, solving the cooperative bargaining game by means of the Nash-
bargaining solution leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4. Both firms, EM and L, will agree to merge if x(t) hits the optimal timing



























As for the big leap, whenever the transactions costs of the hostile acquisition are
larger than those of the friendly merger, the non-cooperative takeover occurs later than
the cooperative merger.12
4.3 Non-Cooperative Acquisition of the Minor Firm
Let us now move backwards to the first stage to modeling the acquisition of M . Assume
this first acquisition takes the form of an hostile takeover. Under this setting, the new
entrant offers the minor incumbent a premium ψhj,M > 0 while the latter firm times
the acquisition. In the generic premium ψhj,M , the subscript j ∈ {f, h} represents the
strategy followed by EM when acquiring L, as the complete solution needs to consider
the subsequent type of deal, as shown in Figure 1.
Let (ωEM − 1)KM denote the resulting synergies, εEMTh,EM and (1 − εEM )Th,EM
denote the transaction costs assigned to each party where εEM ∈ (0, 1) indicates the
fraction of the transaction costs (Th,EM ) assigned to E. Hence, for any given premium
level ψhj,M > 0 M ’s timing decision to sell the company solves the following optimization

















where β1 comes as before.
Again, firm E anticipates the reaction function of the minor firm and grants an optimal
12x∗ih,L > x
∗
if,L, for Tf,ML 6 Th,ML, given that εML < 1.
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premium such that it maximizes its objective function. However, since the new entrant’s
true intention is to buy the large firm, a subsequent option emerges, i.e. to buy the large
firm after acquiring the minor one. Hence, firm E’s objective function becomes:
max
ψhj,M






where Fj(.), with j ∈ {f, h}, denotes the option to buy the large firm after successful
acquisition of the minor firm. Obviously, a solution to the decision problem is only ob-
tainable once a flexibility value can be assigned to the subsequent option to merge with
the large firm, and depends on the strategy followed in that acquisition, which can either
be friendly (forming a mixed acquisition strategy) or hostile (leading to a pure hostile
strategy). We start with the latter.
4.3.1 Pure hostile strategy (hh)
For the pure hostile strategy we need to incorporate the solution of the non-cooperative
acquisition of L into the non-cooperative acquisition of M . Having derived the optimal






















hh,M (ψhh,M )) into Equation (24) we can now solve for the optimal
premium ψ∗hh,M and acquisition threshold x
∗
hh,M marking the first phase of the sequential
acquisition program.
A closer look, however, reveals that two cases are possible. On the one hand, the
acquisitions by E follow a real sequence, i.e. after buying the minor firm it will wait and
buy, later on, the large incumbent. In such a case, the ordering of the acquisition threshold
follows x∗hh,M < x
∗
hh,L, which means the trigger for acquiring M under the pure hostile
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strategy is smaller than the trigger to acquire L after the acquisition of M takes place. On
the other hand, the entry might be characterized by a big-bang solution where E buys both
firms at the investment trigger x∗hh,M (the acquisition of L taking place immediately after
the acquisition of M), which occurs when x∗hh,M > x
∗
hh,L. Next we present the solutions
for both cases.
Case 1: Sequential Entry (x∗hh,M < x
∗
hh,L)
In this case of sequential acquisitions, where E firstly acquires M at x(t) = x∗hh,M and
then waits for x(t) = x∗hh,L to acquire L, the following propositions summarize the findings
regarding an optimal contract design.
Proposition 5. For the first takeover, firm E offers the premium ψ∗hh,L and waits opti-
mally until x(t) hits the trigger value x∗hh,M , given by:
ψ∗hh,M = 1 +
(β1 − 1)(1− εEM )
β1 − εEM









From the optimal results we see that the merger between M and L is irrelevant for
both the firm E’s optimal offered premium as well as for the minor incumbent’s timing
decision. Neither ψ∗hh,M nor x
∗
hh,M depend on the characteristics of the subsequent merger
with L, e.g. its synergies, transaction costs or premium offered.
Case 2: Big-bang takeover (x∗hh,M > x
∗
hh,L)
In the second case, however, firm E assigns no additional flexibility value to merge
subsequently with the large incumbent L. Rather, it is already optimal to merge with L.
Consequently, Fh(.) just reflects the intrinsic value assigned to the immediate acquisition.
As soon as E finds it optimal to give up the option to wait to acquire the minor firm it will
exercise the option to merge with the large firm, too. Since the acquisition of L can only
18
occur after the acquisition of M , and given that, for the sake of simplicity, we are assuming
that an acquisition does not take time to be completed, the two acquisitions happen
in sequence, the second immediately after the first. Hence, the following propositions
summarizes the optimal contract for such a big-bang entry.
Proposition 6. For the first takeover, the firm E offers the premium ψ∗hh,M and waits
optimally until x(t) hits the trigger value x∗hh,M , given by:
ψ∗hh,M = 1 +
(β1 − 1)(1− εEM )Th,EM











zh = (ωEM − 1)KM + (ωML − 1)KL (30)
The premium offered in the second acquisition (to L), ψ̄hh,L, is such that x
∗
hh,M (ψ̄hh,L) =
x∗hh,L(ψ̄hh,L), which corresponds to:
ψ̄hh,L = 1 +
(β1 − 1)(1− εML)Th,ML




which is smaller than the premium for the sequential case. The premium offered in the
first acquisition (to M) is higher in the big-bang case than in the sequential case.
Proof. See Appendix.
Obviously, assuming that x∗hh,M > x
∗
hh,L, i.e. a strict inequality would also result
in a premium offered to M such that a big-bang solution is optimal. However, such a
premium would only be second-best. To see this, consider that E is the proposer in both
M&As. Hence, any ψ offered to L that leads to x∗hh,M > x
∗
hh,L indicates that EM has
paid too much for L. Consequently, EM could offer less such that it induces L to time
the M&A later. The proceeds can be used to stimulate earlier M&A timing of M by
paying it a higher premium. We will refer to this as a first-mover pass-through where E
can pass its initial first-mover advantage on to subsequent negotiations. Consequently,
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there is only one first-best premium ψ̄hh,L offered such that it aligns both thresholds, i.e.
x∗hh,M (ψ
∗
hh,M ) = x
∗
hh,L(ψ̄hh,L). There is a joint effect in lowering the premium. One the
one hand, by paying less to L its takeover will happen later (i.e., L’s trigger for selling
the assets will be higher if the offered premium is smaller) but, on the other hand, a lower
premium means a higher stake for EM , making the first acquisition more attractive, and
so happening sooner. Finally, the entrant E is willing to pay a higher premium to M ,
lowering its threshold, to get access as soon as possible to the valuable second acquisition.
Moreover, we see that the determinants of the subsequent M&A deal now strongly
affect the contract design between E and M (see Equations (28) and (29)). Interestingly,
the first acquisition needs not produce positive synergies (ωEM − 1 can be negative), as
long as the subsequent acquisition synergies compensate sufficiently in order to make zh
positive, which is the only condition needed to produce a meaningful threshold.13 This is in
contrast to the pure sequential case where an acquisition of M is only likely if ωEM−1 > 0.
Finally, we can provide an answer to the question about the key determinants when
choosing between the sequential entry and the big-bang solution. A closer look reveals
that the ordering of the investment thresholds depends on the level of achievable synergies,
the transaction costs and the sizes of the capital stock. An analytical solution can be
provided that marks the choice between the big-bang and sequential acquisition which is
summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition 7. The new entrant will switch from sequentially acquiring the incumbent
firms M and L to a big-bang takeover of M and L should the factor of the achievable
synergies ωML due to acquiring the large firm be higher than:
ωML > Ωhh = 1 +
(β1 − εML)Th,ML
(β1 − εEM )Th,EM




A big-bang takeover occurs when the threshold of the first acquisition is above the
threshold of the second acquisition (x∗hh,M > x
∗
hh,L), which requires a sufficiently large
13Notice, however, that the second acquisition must produce positive synergies, otherwise it will never
be optimal.
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synergy (attractiveness) of the second acquisition (ωML > Ωhh). When that synergy is low,
the entrant will prefer to wait to acquire L after the acquisition of M . A more attractive
first acquisition (higher ωEM ) hastens the first acquisition, and, therefore, requires a more
attractive second acquisition (higher Ωhh) to make the big-bang preferable to the sequential
entry.
4.3.2 Mixed acquisition strategy (hf )
Consider now the mixed alternative. For this case we need to incorporate the solution of
the friendly merger with L into the non-cooperative acquisition of M . The value function
















hf,EM (ωMLKL + ωEMKM )− ωEMKM . (34)
By inserting Ff (.) into Equation (24) we can now solve for the optimal premium ψ
∗
hf,M
and acquisition threshold x∗hf,M . As before, two possible cases need again to be considered.
In the first case, E acquires M and waits before moving towards L, as the trigger to acquire
the latter has not yet been achieved (x∗hf,M < x
∗
hf,L), while in the second, that occurs when
x∗hf,M > x
∗
hf,L, firm E takes M and immediately after acquires L (the big-bang solution).
Case 1: Sequential Entry (x∗hf,M < x
∗
hf,L)
In this case, firm EM can capture the full value of the option to merge subsequently
with the large incumbent L when offering the bid to M . The following proposition sum-
marizes the optimal contract.
Proposition 8. The acquisition of the minor firm takes place if the minor firm receives




from below, where ψ∗hf,M and x
∗
hf,M are given by:
ψ∗hf,M = 1 +
(β1 − 1)(1− εEM )
β1 − εEM








Again, the findings reveal that in the case of sequential entry by means of acquisitions
the optimal contract offers to M is not affected by the subsequent merger with L. There-
fore, when the sequential merger is optimal, both strategies occur at the same timing and







Case 2: Big-bang Entry (x∗hf,M > x
∗
hf,L)
In this case the two acquisitions happen one immediately after the other. Obviously,
as in the case for the pure hostile acquisition program, we would expect that in such a
setting the contract design with M is affected by the characteristics of the subsequent
takeover with L which is supported by the results.
Proposition 9. The acquisition of the minor firm takes place if the minor firm receives
an optimal premium ψ∗hf,M and waits until x(t) hits the optimal trigger value x(t) = x
∗
hf,M
from below, where ψ∗hf,M and x
∗
hf,M are given by:
ψ∗hf,M = 1 +
(β1 − 1)(1− εEM )Th,EM











zf = (ωEM − 1)KM + ηML(ωML − 1)KL (39)
= zh − (1− ηML)(ωML − 1)KL 6 zh
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In the big-bang strategy the premium paid in the first acquisition is higher than that
paid in the sequential case.
Proof. See Appendix.
Comparing the findings with the big-bang solution of the pure hostile acquisition, it
becomes apparent that the contract design is different. In particular, since the trigger for
the friendly merger can not be manipulated (e.g. postponed), as it is a central planner’s
trigger, there is no first-mover pass-through possible and thus the alignment of the two
merger thresholds is not possible. However, since the takeover of M immediately leads to
the merger with L, firm E settles a higher premium to be offered to M (when compared to
the premium paid in the sequential case), which anticipates the takeover. Notice that, as
the alignment is not possible, two triggers are in place, x∗hf,M (Equation (37)) and x
∗
hf,L,
but the former is the one that drives the timing for initiating the acquisition program.
Naturally, since x∗hf,L < x
∗
hf,M , the sharing rule is determined at x
∗
hf,M (i.e. when the
acquisition program is initiated), and not at x∗hf,L.
14 As for the pure hostile big-bang
case, the first acquisition needs not produce positive synergies, as long as the subsequent
acquisition synergies compensate sufficiently in order to make zf positive.
The choice between the big-bang entry and the sequential acquisition is summarized
by the following proposition.
Proposition 10. The new entrant will switch from sequentially acquiring the firm M and
merge with L to a big-bang solution should the factor of the achievable synergies ωML due
to acquiring the large firm be higher than:
ωML > Ωhf = 1 +
(β1 − 1)Tf,ML
(β1 − εEM )Th,EM








For identical or lower transaction costs, a big-bang entry requires lower synergies for the
14Please refer to the proof of Proposition 9.
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mixed hostile-friendly strategy than for the pure hostile strategy.15 This happens because
the friendly merger with L happens sooner than the hostile takeover and, therefore, lower
ωML synergies are required to move the threshold below that of the first acquisition.
4.4 Cooperative Acquisition of the Minor Firm
Let us now complete our analysis by considering that the acquisition of M takes the form
of a friendly merger. As before, the complete solution for this strategy depends on the
type of the subsequent acquisition of L, friendly or hostile, as shown in Figure 1. The




((1− γ)(ωEMKMx(t) + Fj(.))−KMx(t)− (1− εEM )Tf,EM )1−ηEM
(γ(ωEMKMx(t) + Fj(.))− εEMTf,EM )ηEM ] (41)
where Fj(.) represent the subsequent hostile (j = h) or friendly (j = f) acquisition of L
(see Equations (25) and (33), respectively).
4.4.1 Mixed acquisition strategy (fh)
Let us start by considering the case where the acquisition of L takes the form of a hostile
takeover. As before, two types of solutions occur regarding the acquisition program: either
E merges with M and then the new entity waits for the optimal moment to acquire L, or
this takeover happens immediately after the first merger. The solutions for both cases are
presented below.
Case 1: Sequential Entry (x∗fh,M < x
∗
fh,L)
For the case where the optimal acquisition of L happens later than the merger with
M , the following proposition applies:
Proposition 11. In the first takeover firms E and M will reach an acquisition agreement
15Ωhf < Ωhh, for Tf,ML 6 Th,ML.
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Firm E’s optimal stake γ∗fh,EM in the merger amounts to:
γ∗fh,EM =
(
















As in the previous cases where the acquisitions take place sequentially, the timing for
merging with M reveals is not affected by the subsequent takeover of L. Differently from
what we saw regarding the optimal premiums, the solutions now show that the sharing
rule will depend on the subsequent option to acquire L.
Case 2: Big-bang entry (x∗fh,M > x
∗
fh,L)
On the other hand, for the big-bang solution, where the acquisition of L occurs imme-
diately after the merger with M , the optimal solutions are:
Proposition 12. In the first takeover firms E and M will reach an acquisition agreement







Firm E’s optimal stake γ∗fh,EM in the merger amounts to:
γ∗fh,EM =
((β1 − 1)εEM + ηEM )Tf,EM + ηEM εEMTh,ML
β1(KM + zh)Tf,EM + (β1KM + zhεML)Th,ML
zh. (45)














As for the other big-bang solutions the characteristics of subsequent deal will influence
the timing, as well as the sharing rule, of the first acquisition. Since the acquisition of L is
done by means of a hostile takeover, EM can use its first-mover advantage to manipulate
the contract design of the subsequent hostile takeover, corresponding to a partial first-
mover pass-through. Differently to the pure hostile big-bang solution, however, EM could
be, under some particular conditions, better off by offering a higher (not lower) premium
to L, maximizing the merger surplus that includes the synergies of the second acquisition
and anticipating even more the hostile takeover.
The level of the synergy factor ωML that separates the regions for the sequential
acquisition and the big-bang is as follows:
Proposition 13. The new entrant will switch from merging with M and acquiring L
sequentially to a big-bang solution should the factor of the achievable synergies ωML due
to acquiring the large firm be higher than:
ωML > Ωfh = 1 +
(β1 − εML)Th,ML
(β1 − 1)Tf,EM




4.4.2 Pure friendly (ff )
Finally, let us consider the pure friendly acquisition program, where both deals take the
form of friendly mergers. As before, true sequential mergers and big-bangs are possible.
Case 1: Sequential Entry (x∗ff,M < x
∗
ff,L)
If the trigger of the first merger happens to be smaller than that of the merger with
L, the set of solution is as follows:
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Proposition 14. In the first merger firms E and M will reach an acquisition agreement,







Firm E’s optimal stake γ∗ff,EM in the merger amounts to:
γ∗ff,EM =
(
(β1 − 1)εEM + ηEM
β1 − 1
)













As the subsequent acquisition of L does not influence the merger with M (however
influencing the sharing rule), the trigger here obtained is the same that of the mixed
friendly-hostile strategy.
Case 2: Big-bang Entry (x∗ff,M > x
∗
ff,L)
Similarly to what happens to the mixed hostile-friendly program, the trigger of the
second merger can not be manipulated, as it is a central planner’s threshold, making the
alignment of the triggers unfeasible. Consequently, the big-bang entry by means of a pure
friendly M&A exhibits no first-mover pass-through. However, given that the merger with
M immediately leads to the second merger with L, its higher intrinsic value influences the
first trigger, hastening the merger with M . The design of the deal is stated below.
Proposition 15. In the first merger firms E and M will reach an acquisition agreement







Firm E’s optimal stake γ∗ff,EM in the merger amounts to:
γ∗ff,EM =
((β1 − 1)εEM + ηEM )Tf,EM + ηEMηMLTf,ML




As in similar case, the sharing rule is calculated for the trigger where the big-bang
takes place (and not at x∗ff,L).
The synergy factor ωML that separates the regions for the sequential mergers and the
big-bang are as follows:
Proposition 16. The new entrant will switch from sequentially acquiring the incumbent
firms M and L to a simultaneous acquisition of M and L should the factor of the achievable
synergies ωML due to acquiring the large firm be higher than:













For identical or lower transaction costs, a big-bang entry requires lower synergies for
the pure friendly strategy than for the mixed friendly-hostile strategy, as the subsequent
merger becomes optimal later for the pure hostile strategy.16
5 Choosing the best strategy
5.1 The value of strategies
Taking the derived optimal contract solutions into account and assuming that the initial
value of x(t) is sufficiently small compared to each strategy’s optimal exercise threshold
then the optimal real option values can be expressed as:
Fj = Ai x
β1 , i ∈ {bh, bf, hh, hf, fh, ff} (53)
where













































































































For defining the strategy to follow over the remaining alternatives, E should compare
the values of Ai, i ∈ {bh, bf, hh, hf, fh, ff}, choosing the alternative with the highest
value. If Abh (Abf ) is the most valuable, E chooses the big leap strategy and places an
hostile (friendly) bid for L, if not, the firm should follow the acquisition program strategy.
Here, E will follow a mixed acquisition program or a pure hostile (friendly) takeover
program depending on the relative values of Ai.
Regarding the two possible strategies for the big leap and the acquisition program
(friendly or hostile), it is trivial to show that a higher power in the bargaining game favors
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Table 1: Base-case parameters
Parameter i = EL i = EM i = ML
Synergies - ωi 1.15 1.20 1.15
Bargaining powers - ηi 0.4 0.5
ηEMKM
ηEMKM +KL
Transaction costs (hostile) - Th,i 0.15 0.10 0.10
Transaction costs (friendly) - Tf,i 0.12 0.08 0.08
Fraction of T - εi 0.5 0.5 0.5
Size of M - KM 1.0
Size of L - KL 1.5
β1 2.5
a friendly approach.17 When E has a sufficiently high bargaining power, it will negotiate
a friendly acquisition of L or M . Obviously, the transactions costs can also determine the
choice of the best strategy. It can be shown that a strategy with lower transaction costs
is preferable.18
The effects of volatility (through β1) and synergies (ωEL, ωEM , and ωML) are not
straightforward. Not only are several of the partial derivatives of the individual As non-
monotonic, but also their dominance over the others is non-monotonic. In the next section
we use a numerical comparative statics, with different sets of parameters, to study the
effects of uncertainty and synergies on the optimal strategy choice.
5.2 The choice of the optimal strategy
In the following, we analyze which of the generic entry strategies, i.e. single takeover of
L or sequential acquisition program, either friendly or hostile, is more valuable to E, by
means of a comparative-static analysis.
Table 1 presents the base-case parameters. We will assume that the transaction costs
that arise are split evenly between the parties, i.e. εEL = εEM = εML = 0.5 and that the










18All the partial derivatives of each Ai to the T ’s involved are positive.
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Tf < Th. We also acknowledge the fact that it is more expensive to acquire the larger
incumbent than the smaller firm when entering the market for the first time (Tf,EL >
Tf,EM , Th,EL > Th,EM ).
Against the background of the M&A literature we first want to discuss the impact
of synergies and how they impact the optimal entry strategy. In particular, each generic
entry strategy is associated with specific synergy multipliers, i.e. ωEL, ωEM , and ωML.
Figure 2 depicts how the level of synergies affects the choice between the big leap and the
acquisition program, for different levels of uncertainty and synergies. In particular, for a
synergy factor ωEM < 1, i.e. when acquiring the minor firm would destroy value, a serial
acquisition program may still be optimal if the synergies of the following acquisition of the
large incumbent (ωML) are sufficiently large, otherwise the big leap strategy’s option value
exceeds the alternatives’ option values (regions bh/bf). For a sufficiently large ωEM , we see
that the firm will prefer an acquisition program over the big leap strategy. In particular, the
firm will initially prefer to acquire M and L by means of pure hostile strategy (region hh),
if the subsequent synergies are large enough (ωML). Should, however, the synergy factor
ωEM further increase then the likelihood increases that E prefers to switch from a hostile
takeover of L to a friendly merger with L (regions hf/ff). In general, we can conclude
that ceteris paribus as synergy factor ωEM further increase relatively ωML an acquisition
program with a pure friendly strategy becomes more and more dominant. This is due to
the fact that higher first acquisition synergies (ωEM ) increase the bargaining power of EM
when it subsequently completes a friendly merger with L. Additionally, M ’s size increases
the bargaining power of EM when acquiring L and enhances the effect of ωEM . Ceteris
paribus, as synergy factor ωML further increase relatively ωEM , an acquisition program
with a pure hostile strategy becomes more and more dominant. Mixed strategies (regions
hf and fh) are optimal for similar ωEM and ωML and high uncertainty (Figures 2(a)
and 2(c)). Under low uncertainty, only pure strategies become optimal (Figures 2(b) and
2(d)).
To further investigate how uncertainty affects the choice of the acquisition program,
Figure 3 shows the different strategy choices as a function of uncertainty (measured by the
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(a) β1 = 2.5;ωEL = 1.15 (b) β1 = 5;ωEL = 1.15
(c) β1 = 2.5;ωEL = 1.4 (d) β1 = 5;ωEL = 1.4
Figure 2: Optimal acquisition strategy choice depending on synergy levels ωML, ωEM . Here,
regions bh and bf mark the big leap hostile takeover of L/friendly merger with L
strategies, regions ij with i, j ∈ {f, h} characterize acquisition program strategies
where E prefers to acquire M and L by means of a hostile takeover (h) or friendly
acquisition (f). (s) indicates that the acquisition program is implemented sequen-
tially. The figure shows the highest option value according to Equation (53) using
the parameters in Table 1.
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β1 factor with ∂β1/∂σ < 0) and the synergy factor ωEM between M and E, for different
levels of the acquisition program synergies (ωEM and ωML). Our results suggest that the
choice between the big leap strategy and the acquisition program strategies is moderately
affected by the level of uncertainty: for low uncertainty the big leap strategy has more
value than that of the acquisition program. Additionally, it becomes apparent that in the
case of increasing uncertainty the strategy to acquire both incumbents by means of a pure
hostile takeover program cannibalizes the other strategies. In particular, as uncertainty
increases we see that the other alternatives’ option values, i.e. acquiring the prominent
incumbent (big leap) as well as the mixed acquisition program and pure friendly strategies
get more and more dominated by the pure hostile takeover acquisition program for a wider
range of the synergy factor ωEM .
Consequently, there are two different economic reasons for this. First, consider the
case of low EM synergies, i.e. ωEM ' 1, similar ML and EL synergies (ωML ' ωEL) and
high uncertainty, i.e. low β1 (Figures 3(a) and 3(d)). At first glance, it seems unprofitable
to acquire M at all, however, the firm favors the acquisition of M over the big leap.
The intuition behind this dominance of the acquisition program over the big leap is that
uncertainty increases the option value to subsequently acquire the large incumbent which
offsets the loss due to low synergies when acquiring M . Second, for a very high synergy
factor ωEM the pure hostile acquisition program will dominate the mixed and pure friendly
acquisition programs as uncertainty increases because the subsequent hostile takeover of
L adds an additional gain as opposed to the friendly merger and this might offset latter’s
earlier timing advantages. In particular, when negotiating the unfriendly takeover the
entrant E acts again as a proposer and thus possesses a first-mover advantage. Hence, as
opposed to the friendly takeover this advantage allows him to better adapt to the changing
environment. For example, when uncertainty is high and the synergies between the large
incumbent L and the new entity EM are high, E can use its better bargaining power
to stimulate an earlier sale of the minor firm M - this will work against the discounting
effect - by proposing a lower premium to the prominent incumbent L. In contrast, in a
friendly merger E cannot act in this manner. Obviously, the higher the uncertainty the
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more valuable becomes the additional degree of freedom the unfriendly takeover provides
and explains why the pure hostile acquisition program will dominate the mixed acquisition
program. In general, a higher uncertainty favors hostile takeovers over friendly mergers,
both in the big leap and acquisition program strategies. Finally, when the synergies of the
big leap are relatively smaller/larger than the acquisition program synergies, the big leap
strategy dominates over a smaller/larger range of ωEM (Figures 3(b) and 3(c)).
Apart from looking whether the big leap or the acquisition program is more valuable,
we want to look closer at the contract structure of each of the acquisition programs. As the
results in the previous section have indicated, there exists a unique boundary that separates
the stepwise acquisition of assets from the big-bang acquisition (see Propositions (7), (10),
(13), and (16)). Consequently, each of the four regions that mark the possible strategies
of an acquisition program can further be divided in stepwise and big-bang acquisitions.
In particular, Figure 2’s regions hh, hf , fh and ff illustrate that the new entrant
will prefer to acquire both firms M and L one immediately after the other (big-bang),
while regions with (s) indicates that the firm will favor to first acquire M and then wait
to acquire L subsequently. As the analytical results indicate, this has consequences for
the acquisition thresholds and deal values. In particular, the contract stimulating the big-
bang acquisition explicitly accounts for the subsequent acquisition possibility expressed
by the characteristics of the prominent incumbent L, e.g. ωML,KL, Tf,ML, Th,ML. (see
propositions (6), (9), (12), and (15)). The economic rationale for this is that a big-
bang acquisition occurs because the subsequent acquisition is much more attractive than
the first acquisition, i.e. x∗ij,L 6 x
∗
ij,M with i, j ∈ {f, h}. When the first acquisition is
hostile, the new entrant E has to pay M a little bit more in order to induce it to sell the
assets sooner, to get access to the second and more synergistic acquisition. For the same
reason, when the first acquisition is friendly, both firms agree to anticipate the merger,
jointly maximizing the merger surplus that includes the synergies of the second acquisition.
When the second acquisition is not sufficiently attractive, a stepwise sequential acquisition
is preferred (bottom-right quadrant of Figure 2 and right-end side of Figure 3).
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(a) ωML = ωEL = 1.15 (b) ωML = 1.3 > ωEL = 1.15
(c) ωML = 1.15 < ωEL = 1.3 (d) ωML = ωEL = 1.3
Figure 3: Optimal acquisition strategy choice depending on synergy levels ωEM and uncer-
tainty level as measured by β1(σ). Here, regions bh and bf mark the big leap
hostile takeover of L/friendly merger with L strategies, regions ij with i, j ∈ {f, h}
characterize acquisition program strategies where E prefers to acquire M and L
by means of a hostile takeover (h) or friendly acquisition (f). (s) indicates that
the acquisition program is implemented sequentially. The figure shows the highest
option value according to Equation (53) using the parameters in Table 1.
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5.3 Testable predictions
Our results generate several new predictions which might motivate empirical research. In
particular we find:
1. If synergies in an acquisition program are dominantly driven by the minor firm’s
synergies, i.e. 1 < ωML << ωEM the new entrant will prefer pure friendly acquisition
programs.
2. If synergies in an acquisition program are dominantly driven by the large firm’s
synergies, i.e. 1 < ωEM << ωML the new entrant will prefer pure hostile acquisition
programs.
3. The new entrant will favor pure hostile acquisition programs over mixed and pure
friendly acquisition programs when entering highly volatile industries.
4. Highly volatile industries are characterized by a higher frequency of acquisition pro-
grams than single acquisitions of the industry’s prominent incumbent.
6 Conclusions
This paper studies the entrance in a market by means of M&A considering two alternative
strategies available to the acquirer. One is the big leap, consisting in the acquisition of
the large incumbent; the other strategy is to set an acquisition program moving in small
steps, first acquiring a minor firm with the option to acquire the larger player later on.
The paper also considers alternative contract designs for the big leap and the acquisition
program, such as hostile, friendly or mixed. We derive analytical closed-form solutions
for the optimal offers to both targets in the case of the acquisition program and contrast
them against the single acquisition possibility.
Our findings reveal that synergies impact on the optimal entry strategy. In particular,
if the acquisition of the minor firm produces relatively low synergies the big leap strategy
tends to be more attractive, unless the former enables access to a high synergistic sub-
sequent acquisition of the large incumbent. We show that for sufficiently large synergies
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of subsequent deals, the acquisition program may be preferable even when acquiring the
minor firm destroys value (has negative synergies). Regarding the acquisition program, we
find that the higher the synergies between the buyer and the minor incumbent, the more
likely he chooses a pure friendly merger strategy, where both acquisitions are cooperative,
while higher synergies between the buyer and the large incumbent stimulate a pure hostile
acquisition strategy, where both acquisitions are non-cooperative. Additionally, by ana-
lyzing the effect of uncertainty on the acquisition strategy we show that highly uncertain
industries will exhibit more pure hostile motivated acquisitions than industries with less
significant uncertainties. Our model also suggests that in such highly uncertain industries
acquisition programs are more frequent than single big leap acquisitions.
When structuring the serial acquisition program, two contract solutions have been
considered. First, the new entrant might stepwise acquire the two incumbents, i.e. first
acquire the minor firm and then wait for the acquisition of the large incumbent at the
optimal timing. Secondly, the new entrant may prefer to acquire both incumbents im-
mediately one after the other, which resembles a big-bang solution. In such a case, the
characteristics associated with the large incumbent affect the optimal contract design of-
fered to the minor incumbent. When that acquisition is hostile, a higher premium is
paid to the minor firm in order to induce it to sell the assets sooner, whereas when it is
friendly, both firms agree to anticipate the deal, jointly maximizing the merger surplus.
When the second acquisition is not sufficiently attractive, a stepwise sequential acquisition
is preferred.
In this paper we assume the new entrant’s capabilities enable the acquisition synergies,
which gives him the ability to define the best acquisition strategy. In our setting, the in-
cumbent firms have a more passive role, i.e. we assume they do not consider the possibility
of whether another acquisition method could increase their value. Further research could
explore the case of a more active role of the other firms, for instance, in the choice between
a friendly merger or a hostile takeover. Additionally, the paper could also be extended
to allow the order of the acquisitions to be endogenously determined. Finally, the capital
markets reactions to the deal announcements could be studied and linked to the premiums
37
and shares captured by the firms.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Solving the maximization problem in Equation (4), the L’s trigger







This optimal trigger is anticipated by E. Incorporating (60) into Equation (5) and max-
imizing for ψbh,L, the solution presented in Equation (6) is obtained. Finally, the trigger
that incorporates the optimal premium is x∗bh,L ≡ x∗bh,L(ψ∗bh,L), for which simply incorpo-
rate (6) into (60) and obtain (7).
Proof of Proposition 2. The central planner’s trigger reflects both firms’ aggregate posi-
tions and comes from the solution of the standard smooth-pasting condition at x(t) =
x∗bf,L:
β1 ((ωEL − 1)KLx(t)− Tf,EL) = (ωEL − 1)KLx(t) (61)
which leads to Equation (12). The general solution for the maximization problem (10) is:
γ(x(t)) =
εELTf,EL − (Tf,EL −KL(ωEL − 1)x(t)) ηEL
KLωELx(t)
(62)
Substituting x∗bf,L for x(t) leads to (13).
Proof of Proposition 3. Similarly to the proof of Proposition 1, firm L times the merger
conditional on the ψih,L offered by EM :
max
x∗ih,L(ψih,L)













which is anticipated by EM who optimally finds the premium:
max
ψih,L






By solving (65), we obtain ψ∗ih,L as presented in (14). Incorporating ψ
∗
ih,L into (64) and
rearranging we get (15).









Equation (20) is the solution. The solution for the optimization problem (18), for any x(t)
is:
γ∗(x(t)) =
Tf,ML(εML − ηML) (ωEMKM + ηML(ωML − 1)KL)x(t)
(ωEMKM + ωMLKL)x(t)
(67)
Computing the optimal stake at the optimal trigger, i.e., setting x(t) = x∗if,L, substituting
ηML according (19), and rearranging we get (21).
Proof of Proposition 5. Proceed as for Proposition 3. The continuation value to be incor-
porated as Fh(.) into Equation (24) to maximize for ψhh,M is the upper branch of Equation
(25). Firm M optimizes for the timing:






and firm E anticipates this outcome, incorporates it into 24 and maximizes for ψ∗hh,M
leading to (26). Equation (27) is obtained incorporating (26) into (68).
Proof of Proposition 6. As the acquisition of L is now in-the-money, the relevant value
function to be incorporated as Fh(.) into (24) is the lower branch of Equation (25).




x∗hh,M (ψhh,M ), i.e., the one that aligns the triggers, which leads to:
ψ̄hh,L = 1 +
(ψhh,M − 1)(1− εML)Th,MLKM
(1− εEM )Th,EMKL
(69)











hh,M ) are as before
and lead to the solutions presented in (28) and (29).
Regarding Equation (31), substitute in (69) ψhh,M by ψ
∗




Proof of Proposition 7. Set Equations (27) and (29) equal and solve for ωML for finding
the level of synergies that separate the sequential and the big-bang regions.
Proof of Proposition 8. To obtain the solutions simply follow the procedure presented ear-
lier, for proving Proposition 5. Notice, however, that the objective function (24) includes
the value of the subsequent acquisition Ff (.). Under a sequential entry, where the subse-
quent acquisition is cooperative, the value of this function is obtained from the first branch
of (33).
Proof of Proposition 9. Proceed as in Proposition 6. The relevant value function to incor-
porate in Equation (24) is now the one represented in the second branch of (33). Notice
that the optimal γ needs to be computed at x(t) = x∗hf,M , and not at x(t) = x
∗
hf,L, as in
Equation (21). Use Equation (62) for this purpose.
Regarding the relative value of the premiums, start with Equations (35) and (37). The
difference between the latter and the former is positive if:
KLTh,EM (β1 − εEM )(ωML − 1) +KMTf,ML(β1 − 1)(ωEM − 1) > 0 (71)
43
which is respected if:
ωML > 1 +
(β1 − 1)Tf,ML
(β1 − εEM )Th,EM
× (ωEM − 1)KM
KL
= Ωhf (72)
Accordingly, if ωML is sufficiently large to produce a big-bang solution, then it also leads
to a premium paid (to M) larger than that paid in the case of a sequential acquisitions.
Proof of Proposition 10. Set Equations (36) and (38) equal and solve for ωML for finding
the level of synergies that separate the sequential and the big-bang regions.
Proof of Proposition 11. In the sequential case, the first branch of (25) is used to incor-
porate as Fj(.) into (41). The trigger, given by Equation (42), corresponds to that of a
central planner and is the solution of the smooth-pasting condition at x(t) = x∗fh,M :
β1
(
(ωEM − 1)KMx(t) +Ahx(t)β1 − Tf,EM
)












tion (43) is the solution of the maximization problem (41) after substituting x(t) for the
respective trigger, x∗fh,M .
Proof of Proposition 12. For the big-bang case, the second branch of (25) is used to in-
corporate as Fj(.) into (41). As before, the trigger (Equation (44)) corresponds to that of
a central planner, and is the solution of the smooth-pasting condition at x(t) = x∗fh,M :
β1
(




(ωML − ψ∗hh,L)KL + (ωEM − 1)KM
)
x(t) (74)
where ψ∗hh,L is set equal to ψ̄fh,L. Equation (45) is the solution of the maximization
problem (41) after substituting x(t) for the respective trigger. Solving the smooth-pasting
44





(ωEM − 1)KM + (ωML − ψ)KL
(75)
Substitute ψ̄fh,L for ψ and ψih,L in (75) and in (64), respectivelly. Set x
∗
fh,M (ψ̄fh,L) =
x∗ih,L(ψ̄fh,L) and solve for ψ̄fh,L.
Proof of Proposition 13. Set Equations (42) and (44) equal and solve for ωML for finding
the level of synergies that separate the sequential and the big-bang regions.
Proof of Proposition 14. In the sequential case, the first branch of (33) is used to incor-
porate as Fj(.) into (41). The trigger is given by Equation (48), and corresponds to that
of a central planner which solves the following smooth-pasting condition at x(t) = x∗ff,M :
β1
(
(ωEM − 1)KMx(t) +Afx(t)β1 − Tf,EM
)









(see the first branch of Equation (33)
and Equation (34)). Equation (49) is the solution of the maximization problem (41) after
substituting x(t) for the respective trigger.
Proof of Proposition 15. For the big-bang case, the second branch of (33) is used to incor-
porate as Fj(.) into (41). The trigger is given by Equation (48), and corresponds to that
of a central planner which solves the following smooth-pasting condition at x(t) = x∗ff,M :
β1 (((ωEM − 1)KM + ηML(ωML − 1)KL)x(t)− Tf,EM − ηMLTf,ML)
= (ωEM − 1)KM + ηML(ωML − 1)KL)x(t) (77)
Equation (51) is the solution of the maximization problem (41) after substituting x(t) for
the respective trigger.
Proof of Proposition 16. Set Equations (48) and (50) equal and solve for ωML for finding
the level of synergies that separate the sequential and the big-bang regions.
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